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3The ITF and the ILO have undertaken research into the impact of the financial crisis on aviation workers
and commended the study ‘The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Labour in the Civil Aviation Industry’
by Professor Peter Turnbull of Cardiff University and Dr. Geraint Harvey of Swansea University. The find-
ings are summarised in this publication that has updated the “Contesting the Crisis” document (from
the same authors and published by the ITF) on the effects on workers of the 2001 crisis
The economic recovery will take time and its benefits are unlikely to filter down to the workforce in the
near future.  Moreover, the economic situation will continue to be used by governments and business
managers to promote restructuring and to attack jobs and working conditions.   
Our industry is going through structural change. The current crisis is not simply yet another cyclical
dip. This means a drive for permanent restructuring by companies and an increasing emphasis on re-
gional and global networks.
The crisis is also being used by airlines to hasten the shift towards the negative aspects of the low cost
carrier model, with the intention of downgrading working conditions and promoting greater casualisa-
tion to reduce labour cost. This strategy is misguided and will not only damage industrial relations but
could have a harmful impact on safety, security and the quality of passenger care.
There is the need to continue to demand carriers and aviation related companies, governments and in-
ternational bodies act urgently to develop an effective strategy with unions that benefit the aviation
industry and its workers. Thus, this publication merits serious consideration and debate by the industry
and should form the basis of a stakeholder dialogue which the ITF has called for.
Gabriel Mocho Rodriguez
Secretary Civil Aviation Section 
ITF
Foreword
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51. Introduction
1 Data from ATAG (2006) The Economic and Social Benefits of Air Transport 2008, Geneva.
2 Harvey, G., and Turnbull, P., (2002) ‘Contesting the Crisis: Aviation Industrial Relations and Trade Union Strategies After 11 September’,
International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), London. ISBN 0-901969-83-4.
3 Blyton, P., Martínez Lucio, M., McGurk, J. & Turnbull, P. Contesting Globalisation: Airline Restructuring, Labour Flexibility and Trade Union
Strategies, 28 pages, London: International Transport Workers’ Federation, 1998.
There is no doubting the social and economic significance of the civil aviation industry to the world
economy. The global economic impact of civil aviation is estimated to be around US$3.5 trillion, equiv-
alent to 7.5 per cent of world GDP.1 In 2006, civil aviation contributed US$408 billion directly to global
GDP, as much as the pharmaceuticals industry, and a further US$465 billion indirectly through the
‘multiplier’ effects of aviation related jobs and economic activity. The industry supports 31.9 million
jobs globally; it created 5.5 million jobs directly in 2006 (with 4.7 million people employed by airlines
and airports and around 800,000 employed in the civil aerospace sector) and a further 6.3 million
jobs via the purchases of goods and services in the air transport supply chain; 2.9 million jobs are cre-
ated by the spending of employees; and 17.1 million jobs are created through air transport’s ‘catalytic’
impact on tourism. However, the synergy between the global economy and demand for air transporta-
tion means that in any economic downturn, civil aviation companies will suffer – and suffer more than
most. While the global crisis of capitalism has wrought its effects on virtually all industrial sectors, the
impact on the international civil aviation industry is especially severe.
This ITF Report documents the findings of research commissioned by the ILO to examine the impact of
the global financial crisis on the major civil aviation markets of the world economy, namely: North
America, Europe and Asia Pacific, along with connecting intercontinental markets (some data have
been gathered, en passant, for Africa, South America and the Middle East). The research focuses on
the restructuring of several different types or category of airline, namely: scheduled/full service, re-
gional, low cost and charter. In addition, information has been obtained from the air navigation service
providers (ANSPs) that support civil aviation. 
The principal source of information for this Report is data supplied by 61 civil aviation unions affiliated
to the ITF. The data therefore mirrors that collected in 2001 in the wake of 9/11, which formed the
basis of a previous ITF report (Harvey and Turnbull 20022, see also Blyton et al. 19983).
In this latest Report we analyse the impact of the financial crisis and the subsequent restructuring on
the workforce at both airlines and ANSPs, and in particular, job losses: how these are managed (e.g.
voluntary or compulsory, selection criteria, etc.); how job losses have been avoided (e.g. early retirement,
short-time working, extended vacations); and any other changes to workers’ terms and conditions of
employment (e.g. pay cuts, suspension of bonus payments, extended hours etc). Before reporting on
the impact of the crisis, we review the broader economic environment for civil aviation, in particular
the (pro-cyclical) pattern of demand, the industry’s cost structure, and the recent and very rapid growth
of low cost airlines. Any one of these factors can create uncertainty and unwelcome competitive pres-
sures on airlines and their workforce. When combined with a global financial crisis and the restructuring
of the industry that is currently set in motion, there is every reason to believe that civil aviation will be
a more hostile place for trade unions and a much harsher place for the industry’s workforce. 
6The impressive growth of the civil aviation industry has continued apace after the downturn following
the 9/11 industry crisis. Between 2001 and 2008 passenger numbers increased from 1.6 billion to 2.3
billion, with attending revenue increase from $307 billion to $564 billion. Although the industry has
recovered well from the last major crisis, it remains extremely sensitive to general economic conditions
in both domestic and international markets. Of particular importance to business success in the industry
is the airlines’ employment relations strategy, which has always played an important part in the com-
petitive performance of carriers and other companies in the civil aviation industry.4 Historically, strikes
and other forms of industrial conflict have attracted a great deal of adverse attention, no doubt because
of their visibility and the immediate impact of any work stoppages on passengers and revenue. The
strike action undertaken by cabin crew at British Airways in March 2010, for example, cost the airline
an estimated £43 million. Disputes such as these often lead to a deterioration in employee morale,
job satisfaction and, as a result, a decline in customer satisfaction.5
Three important features of the industry ensure that industrial relations are invariably an exigent en-
deavour. First, the industry’s product is perishable and airlines have no real inventory. Thus, if flights
are cancelled, airlines cannot “stockpile” or easily recover lost traffic in the immediate future. Second,
demand for air transport is pro-cyclical, that is, air traffic generally expands (contracts) with increased
(reduced) economic growth, but at a much faster rate. Business class travel is particularly sensitive to
economic fluctuations, which has a disproportionate impact on airlines’ revenue and profitability. Third,
labour accounts for a significant proportion of total operating costs and is one of the few variable costs
under the direct and more immediate control of management (unlike fuel costs, landing charges, aircraft
costs, etc.). Labour costs typically account for a fifth of the operating costs of Asian airlines and a third
for European and US carriers.6 In other areas of the industry, such as air traffic control, around two-
thirds of operating costs are labour costs. 
These three features of the industry have important implications for human resource management poli-
cies and labour relations. First, the “perishability factor” means that in response to any crisis, airlines
will try to move quickly to cut capacity in order to minimise financial losses. Capacity cuts invariably
result in job losses, both directly and indirectly (i.e. jobs are lost at the airline in question and in a range
of support activities such as catering, cleaning, fuelling, airport services, local suppliers etc.). It has
been argued that for every one job lost in an airline, between four and ten jobs will be lost inside the
perimeter of the airport and a minimum of a further three jobs per airline lost outside the perimeter.7
In the words of one union official, “Job losses in the industry are like a wave, or a ripple on a pond. It
starts with the airlines and just gets bigger and bigger the further out you move from the airport to
the local community and related businesses”.8
The second factor, the pro-cyclical nature of the industry, is illustrated in Figure 1. This particular pattern
of demand often means that the expectations of management and labour are out of step with current
or future market conditions. For example, during any downturn or crisis, when airlines suffer a more
significant decline in demand than most related businesses, cost will be tightly controlled and employ-
ees are often expected to make sacrifices to safeguard the financial position of the airline. When busi-
ness picks up, airlines still tend to be cautious on costs, knowing that traffic might be lost to rivals in
an increasingly competitive and deregulated aviation market or adversely affected by any future down-
turn. Employees, in contrast, anticipate improvements in pay and benefits in line with business pros-
perity, as well as an element of “catch up” to make up for previous concessions. This “mismatch” is most
apparent, and potentially most explosive, at the peak of the business cycle, when employee expectations
are still rising but airlines anticipate, or actually face, falling demand.
4 Turnbull, P., and Harvey, G. (2001) The Impact of 11 September in the Civil Aviation Industry: Social and Labour Effects, Working
Paper No. 182, Geneva: International Labour Office.
5 Lebrecht, D. (1999) Effects on Airline Employees of Growing Competition, Airline Industrial Relations Conference, SMi Group, 25-6
October, London.
6 Doganis, R. (2006) The Airline Business, London: Routledge.
7 TGWU (2001) Evidence to the Transport Sub-Committee from the Transport and General Workers’ Union, London: TGWU.
8 Interview notes.
2. Traffic growth, labour relations 
and the current crisis
7Figure 1. Pro-cyclical demand and economic crises in the civil aviation industry
Source: ICOA, EIU, IATA
The third factor – airlines’ cost structure – means that adjustments made in response to any crisis in-
variably focus on personnel costs. In fact, in an age of globalisation and an ever more deregulated op-
erating environment, labour increasingly bears the brunt of cost-cutting programmes, service quality
initiatives, outsourcing strategies, etc. Indeed, after September 11th the cost reduction strategies of
airlines, especially those based in North America, included a range of HR policies designed to elicit
cost reduction from labour, most notably voluntary and compulsory redundancies.9 Despite this, US
airline employment costs have continued to rise in line with general wage increases and the consumer
price index, which is testament to the bargaining power of organised labour.10 More importantly, while
labour cost reductions have provided short-term relief for US carriers, this has not led to long-term im-
provements in operational performance (productivity and service).11 For full service carriers in particular,
closing the gap on low cost airlines in terms of labour costs, which is illustrated in Figure 2, does not
necessarily translate into a narrowing of the overall cost disadvantage they face in relation to low cost
airlines, as illustrated in Figure 3. The lesson is clear: it takes far more imagination, innovation and cre-
ativity on the part of airline management than simply cutting workers pay and/or terms and conditions
of employment if they hope to remain competitive in the face of low cost competition.
Figure 2. Converging Labour Costs: US Legacy vs Low Cost Carriers (LCC)
Source: MIT Global Aviation Project
9 Turnbull, P., and Harvey, G. (2001) The Impact of 11 September in the Civil Aviation Industry: Social and Labour Effects, Working
Paper No. 182, Geneva: International Labour Office.
10 Civil aviation is one of the most highly unionised industries in the USA.
11 Bamber, G.J., Hoffer Gittell, J., Kochan, T.A. & von Nordenflytch, A. (2009).  Up in the Air: How Airlines Can Improve Performance by
Engaging their Employees.  New York: Cornell University Press.
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8Figure 3. Diverging Unit Costs: US Legacy Airlines vs Low Cost Carriers
Source: MIT Global Aviation Project
The impact of cost-cutting in the USA in the wake of 9/11 is graphically illustrated by data from the
Wilson Center for Public Research. Data from interviews with more than 150,000 flight attendants and
pilots shows a marked decline in the number of employees who report a positive assessment of how
managers are running the airline (Figure 4), how they treat employees (Figure 5), and not surprisingly
their perceptions of morale in the industry. There is no need here to spell out the implications of these
findings for customer service.
Figure 4. Positive Views of How Management is Running the Airline
Source: The Wilson Center for Public Research, Inc
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9Figure 5. Positive Views of Management’s Treatment of Employees
Source: The Wilson Center for Public Research, Inc
Figure 6. Positive Views of Employee Morale
Source: The Wilson Center for Public Research, Inc
The operating conditions that prevail in civil aviation – a perishable product, pro-cyclical demand, and
a high proportion of labour costs – have assumed greater importance in recent years due to changes
to the competitive and legislative environment of civil aviation. Both domestic and international com-
petition has intensified markedly as a result of deregulation, liberalisation, and the commercialisation
or full privatization of many airlines. Liberalisation permitted the establishment of the low cost airline
- the success of this model, particularly since the industry crisis that followed September 11th 2001,
has proven especially problematic for labour as many traditional scheduled or legacy airlines have set
up their own low cost airline, while others have been forced to cut costs in order to compete. In the
latter case, labour plays an ever more prominent role in the competitive strategies of carriers that seek
to reduce fares while maintaining or improving service quality. Further liberalisation of the industry is
set to exacerbate matters for labour as many airlines stand to gain (and many trade unions to lose)
from ever increasingly open skies.12
On some routes, low cost airlines “stimulate the market” (e.g. London-Barcelona or London-Athens). In
other words, they add additional passengers while legacy airlines continue to carry a similar number
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12 Turnbull, P., and Harvey, G. (2009) “Just Another Crisis? Recession, Legislation and the Future of Industrial Relations in the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Industry”, presented at the BUIRA conference, Cardiff (June).
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of passengers compared to the period before the entry of low cost airlines. On other routes, they eat
into the market share of legacy airlines (e.g. London-Valencia) while also adding more passengers.
Whatever the competitive dynamics, the result is an ever increasing market share captured by low cost
airlines. In Europe, for example, they held 43% of the market in 2008 compared to only 17% in 2003.
In several European countries (e.g. Spain, UK, Ireland, Poland and Italy) low cost airlines now account
for more than half the market. As Figure 7 illustrates, low cost airlines hold a much larger share of the
European market than other regional markets. For unions in these other markets, the European experi-
ence may well be a portent of what is to come.
Figure 7. Market Share of Low Cost Airlines 2008 (Region-by-region)
In this context, the global financial meltdown has occasioned a profound crisis in civil aviation, the im-
pact of which has already eclipsed that of 9/11. In June 2009, Giovanni Bisignani, Director General of
the International Air Transport Association (IATA), stated that the current economic crisis has produced
a civil aviation context without “modern precedent ... This is the most difficult situation that the industry
has faced”. Comparing the current crisis with that which followed 9/11, Mr Bisignani noted that rev-
enues fell by 7 per cent post-2001 whereas the decline in 2009 was 15 per cent. Today’s crisis is ex-
pected to reduce passenger demand by 8 per cent and freight traffic by 17 per cent. The operating
losses of the world’s top 150 airlines in 2008 totalled US$15bn, marking a massive US$44bn swing
from the US$29bn profit recorded by these airlines in 2007.13
IATA data indicate that no geographical region was immune to the crisis with total losses of $16 billion
in 2008 and specific geographical losses of US$9.6 billion among US carriers, US$4.7 billion among
Asia-Pacific airlines, US$0.3 billion among Middle Eastern carriers, US$1.4 million among Latin Amer-
ican airlines, and US$100 million among African carriers. In the words of Paul Coby, Chief Information
Officer at British Airways, “This economic crisis which we are facing today is different to any other we
have faced in our lifetime. It is hitting every region. What next? The four horsemen of the apocalypse?”14
In the USA there were thirteen airline bankruptcies in 2008. In 2009, several US airlines ceased trading
leading to the loss of thousands of jobs, e.g. Aloha Airlines (1,900 staff) and ATA Airlines (2,300 staff).
Reminiscent of their response to the crisis following September 11th, US airlines moved very quickly to
announce employment cutbacks (see Table 1). It has been argued that US carriers would be able to
weather the crisis better than airlines in other geographical regions as a result of the changes made by
the airlines early in 2008 in response to increased fuel prices. US airlines responded to the fuel price
inflation by retiring older and less economical aircraft and so were better placed to deal with the re-
duction in demand.  Moreover, airlines in the US have a much lower level of fuel hedging and so stood
to benefit from the sharp reduction in the cost of oil throughout 2008.15 Bureau of Transport Statistics,
presented in Table 1, illustrate the actual headcount reduction at the US majors and larger low cost
and regional airlines between May 2008 and May 2009.  
0 10 20 30 40 50
Market share (%)
Middle East
Africa
South America
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North America
Europe
13 Airline Business (August, 2009). The last time the world’s top 150 airlines sank into the red was in the wake of 9/11, when they lost
US$5.7bn.
14 Airline Business (August 2009).
15 Schofield, A., and Wall, R. (2008) “Role Reversal”, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 169(23) December 15th, Pages 34-35.
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Note: * FTE (full time equivalent employees) include all employees, with two part time employees in-
cluded as one full time employee.
Job reduction at the recently merged Delta/Northwest reflects the innovative approach adopted by
the former in response to the industry crisis after September 11th.16 At that time, the airline offered six
different voluntary job reduction programmes, so that only 2,000 of the required 11,000 job losses
were involuntary. Similarly, in 2008, Delta offered a voluntary severance scheme to 4,000 employees.
The merged airline announced that the same approach would be used to reduce its 75,000 strong
staff by 8% in 2009.
In Europe, several airlines have also ceased trading. For example, UK based XL Airways, which employed
around 1,700 staff, and Dalavia, the Russian carrier formerly employing around 2,800 staff, have gone
bust. Job reduction schemes have been widespread among European airlines. In the autumn of 2008,
Aer Lingus announced 1,500 job losses. In July 2009, the airline proposed a further headcount reduc-
tion of 800 staff. Scandinavian Air Services has announced the most radical job reduction plans in Eu-
rope with 9,000 job losses (some 40% of the employee workforce). 
Policy alternatives to job cuts were seen at Lufthansa, which planned to reduce the working hours of
2,600 employees at its air freight operations.17 Meanwhile, pay freezes were imposed on staff at BA,
bmi and Virgin (the latter consulting with staff over the possible loss of 600 jobs, while the CEO of BA
asked staff to work one month without pay). Finnair has limited its redundancies, to around 120 
jobs lost, by temporarily laying off 380 staff along with 3,000 staff who will be out of work for a 
month. The firm will also not renew the temporary contracts of 400 staff. Fellow Finnish airline Blue1
has implemented a scheme whereby each of its 100 pilots was laid off for 11 days between January
and May 2009. 
In the Asian Pacific region, anticipated to be hardest hit by the current financial crisis, Oasis Hong
Kong Airlines (with some 700 staff) ceased trading. Air New Zealand has retrenched 200 jobs while
Australian carriers Qantas and Virgin Blue have announced 1,750 and 400 job cuts respectively. The
latter has also required that senior managers take 30% pay reduction. In October 2008, Indian airline
Jet Airways sacked 800 employees, of 1900 planned redundancies, only to reinstate them several days
later following industrial action at the airline.18 Alternative labour cost savings policies were being con-
sidered at the airline including a recruitment freeze and the non-renewal of temporary contracts. The
airline has announced plans to reduce salaries by between 5% and 25%. 
Carrier Initial lay-offs Actual FTE* headcount differential 
announced in 2008 (May 2008 and May 2009)
Total % of workforce
Southwest NA 1,500 4.4%
American Eagle NA (500) (5.8%)
Continental 3,000 (1,500) (4.1%)
US Airways 1,700  (1,900) (5.8%)
Delta 4,000 (3,300) (6.9%)
Northwest 2,500 (4,300) (14.7%)
American Airlines 7,000 (4,900) (6.6%)
United Airlines 7,000 (6,600) (12.6%)
16 See Turnbull, P., and Harvey, G. (2001) The Impact of 11 September in the Civil Aviation Industry: Social and Labour Effects, Working
Paper No. 182, Geneva: International Labour Office.
17 Lufthansa was ranked as the most profitable airline worldwide in 2008. It is also the world’s top carrier by revenue (Airline Business,
August 2009).
18 The national government in India has openly criticised airlines that have tried to retrench large numbers of staff.
Table 1 – Initial and actual job reductions among US majors and larger low cost 
and regional carriers
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Asia Pacific airlines have also introduced policy alternatives to job reduction. For example, furloughs
have been introduced at Air India whereby 15,000 workers were given the opportunity to voluntarily
take leave without pay for three to five years. In April 2009, Cathay Pacific asked that its 17,000 em-
ployees take up to four weeks unpaid holiday in the subsequent 12 months. Singapore Airlines has
frozen wages and required that personnel take one day’s leave per month as annual or unpaid leave.
Similarly in January 2009, Japan Airlines required its 16,000 employees to take two months unpaid
leave. The airline also temporarily suspended its pilot training, raising concerns not only about aircraft
safety but of the airline’s ability to meet the inevitable increase in demand on the economic upswing
due to the global shortage of pilots.
Elsewhere, the South African budget carrier, Nationwide Airlines, employing some 800 staff, ceased
trading, while the Mexcian airline AeroCalifornia was grounded in July 2008 as a result of unpaid
debts.
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The human resource (HR) policy measures introduced by civil aviation companies to achieve a reduction
in head-count, contain costs and enhance the organisation’s responsiveness to the market can be
grouped into four broad areas of flexibility, namely:
• Numerical – changes to the total workforce (e.g. recruitment freeze, early retirement, redundancy,
furloughs or non-renewal of temporary contracts)
• Temporal – changes to working time (e.g. short-time working and part-time working)
• Functional – changes to job boundaries or skills (e.g. training or re-training activities, job enlargement
or job enrichment programmes)
• Financial – changes to remuneration (e.g. pay cuts, wage freeze, forgoing bonus or holiday payments,
or employee share ownership plans to link pay more closely to corporate performance)
The data presented in this section are ‘illustrative’ rather than strictly (or statistically) ‘representative’.
The data are based on information collected from a survey that returned responses from: 61 trade
unions representing airline employees (33 from Europe; 10 from Asia Pacific; 8 from Africa; 5 from
Latin America; 1 from the Middle East; 4 from North America); 21 unions representing air traffic control
employees (13 from Europe; 3 from Asia Pacific; 2 each from Latin America and the Middle East; and
1 from North America); and management at 13 airlines (6 from European airlines; 2 from North Amer-
ican carriers; 2 from Middle Eastern airlines; and 3 from Asia Pacific airlines).
The survey of trade unions representing airline staff reveals the most common response to the current
crisis to be a recruitment freeze (reported by 80 per cent of respondent airline unions).19 Other common
cost cutting measures designed to avoid the enforced lay-offs of core staff include voluntary redundancy
(reported by 57 per cent of respondent airline unions); non-renewal of temporary contracts (57 per
cent); pay freeze (51 per cent); probationary staff not being transferred to full time contracts (44 per
cent); voluntary retirement (43 per cent); and unpaid holiday leave (43 per cent). Despite all of this,
38 per cent of unions reported compulsory redundancy.
In terms of numerical, financial and functional flexibility, a very similar picture emerges from the current
data to that of 2001, with widespread use of recruitment freeze, voluntary redundancy, probationary
staff not being transferred to full time contracts and non-renewal of temporary contracts. However,
there appears to have been a greater reliance upon the use of HR policies designed to achieve temporal
flexibility in order to save costs this time around. 
The 2009 data indicate that policies were more likely to be introduced by international or major airlines
rather than at domestic or regional carriers (as they were among ground handling firms as opposed to
catering, maintenance or airports). Compulsory redundancy, voluntary furlough and compulsory fur-
lough were more likely to affect North American employees than their counterparts in either Europe or
Asia Pacific. 
In Europe, several examples of ‘good practice’ have emerged.20 AirFrance-KLM have announced that
the 3,000 job cuts required will be achieved through suspending hiring, not renewing temporary con-
tracts and not replacing retiring members of staff thereby avoiding redundancies. In the UK, consul-
tation between British Airways and the British Air Line Pilots Association (BALPA), the trade union for
pilots in the UK, has led to agreement over a cost reduction package that will save the airline £26mil-
lion per year. The deal will entail a 2.61 per cent cut in basic pay and a 20 per cent reduction in flying
time allowances (leading to a saving of £16million). Moreover, an increase in annual duty hours, a re-
duction in turnaround times on short haul flights and reduced crewing arrangements on some long
haul flights would save the company a further £10million. The pay reduction and productivity deal
3. Industry restructuring in the wake 
of the financial crisis
19 Recruitment freeze was also the most common policy introduced in the wake of 9/11, with 83 per cent of respondent unions recog-
nising this policy at airlines in which it represented workers.
20 ‘Good practice’ is defined in terms of being more ‘socially acceptable’ to those affected
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have been exchanged for shares worth £13million, to be given in June 2011 if certain company targets
are achieved.21
Similarly, Thomson Airways has engaged in elaborate discussion with BALPA in order to arrive at an
agreement on a 5% pay cut for pilots employed at the airline in order to save up to 100 pilot jobs. The
latter has been described by the union as a ‘landmark agreement’, which ensures that the 96 pilot jobs
that would otherwise have been lost as a result of the airline’s decision to operate eleven fewer aircraft.
The agreement entitles pilots to additional days off in lieu of their loss of pay. BALPA General Secretary,
Jim McAuslan, said of the deal that it reflected a partnership of ‘mutual trust and mutual respect’ be-
tween the union and the airline and their shared ‘desire to find an answer, not a problem’.22
As indicated above, the knock-on effects of the reduction in the capacity of airlines can be substantial,
both inside and outside of the civil aviation industry. The impact of the current crisis in civil aviation
on the air navigation service provider (ANSP) is especially potent as many are prevented from holding
financial reserves or obtaining commercial loans. With falls of up to 20 per cent in revenues, ANSPs
are, in the words of Alexander Ter Kuile, Secretary General of CANSO, ‘facing an unprecedented financial
crisis which may result in them not being able to meet their financial obligations’.23 Moreover, ANSPs
Policy 2001* 2009
NUMERICAL
Recruitment freeze 78 80
Voluntary early retirement 44 43
Voluntary redundancy 42 57
Compulsory redundancy 22 38
Voluntary furlough 27 31
Compulsory furlough 18 16
Probationary staff not transferred to full time contracts 47 44
Non-renewal of temporary contracts 53 57
TEMPORAL
Short-time working 20 39
Shorter working week 9 25
Fewer shifts per month 11 33
Part-time working 33 36
FUNCTIONAL
Work-sharing 13 20
Reduced training 27 33
Educational leave 9 25
FINANCIAL
Unpaid holiday/leave 33 43
Forgo bonus pay 16 18
Forgo holiday pay 9 7
Pay freeze 38 51
Pay cut – management 44 33
Pay cut - staff 33 26
Table 2 – HR policy Responses to the Crisis at Airlines (2001/2009 comparison)
*data for ‘major/flag’ airlines
21 More recent events at BA – the airline’s unwillingness to accept a similar package of cost reduction measures proposed by Unite – in-
dicate that the airline’s agenda is not simply driven by a desire to cut costs but also to cut the bargaining power of cabin crew. 
22 www.balpa.org
23 CANSO’s Open Letter to Aircraft Operators, 27th March 2009
24 Michaels, D. And Pasztor, A. “Staffing shortages raise concerns about air safety”, Wall Street Journal Europe, 8th May 2008.
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are restricted in their HR policy response to the crisis due to the Spartan staffing of ANSPs by air trans-
port control officers (ATCOs).24 IFATCA claim that around 3,000 ATCOs are required to meet the present
needs of the world’s ANSPs, adding the caveat that this is a conservative estimated as many ATCOs are
currently working excessive overtime.25 CANSO claims that ANSPs have responded to the crisis by re-
ducing staff overtime and/or external staff numbers; freezing pay; offer voluntary early retirement;
and reducing training. 
Unions representing ATCOs report the use of far fewer HR policies that affect their members: only 24
per cent of respondents identify a recruitment freeze; no respondent identified voluntary or compulsory
redundancy, reflecting the staff shortages, while compulsory furloughs were reported by only 5 per
cent. Far more widespread was the use of non-renewal of temporary contracts (24 per cent) and remu-
neration adjustments such as pay freezes (reported by 29 per cent) (see Table 4). 
The most widely used policy was that of reduced training (reported by 38 per cent of respondents).
This is of considerable concern to IFATCA, and its affiliate unions representing ATCOs, who rightly point
out that training is fundamental to the safe operation of air traffic management. Moreover, they argue
that the ‘concept design, development, prototyping, testing and validation’ of the new SESAR and
NEXTGEN technologies will require experienced air traffic controllers. The safe introduction of these
new advanced technologies necessitates not only greater levels of staffing, but also more extensive
training. Reduced training is thus seen as a considerable threat to the general operation of air traffic
management and certainly to the safe introduction of this new technology.
Policy North Europe Asia  Latin Africa Middle
America Pacific America East
NUMERICAL
Recruitment freeze 25 88 70 100 75 100
Voluntary early retirement 50 58 40 0 0 100
Voluntary redundancy 50 64 60 60 25 100
Compulsory redundancy 50 36 20 60 38 100
Voluntary furlough 50 39 20 0 13 100
Compulsory furlough 50 12 10 0 38 0
Probationary staff not 
transferred to full time contracts 0 55 20 60 38 100
Non-renewal of temp. contracts 0 73 50 40 38 100
TEMPORAL
Short-time working 50 49 20 20 38 0
Shorter working week 25 27 10 20 25 100
Fewer shifts per month 25 39 10 40 25 100
Part-time working 25 49 20 20 13 100
FUNCTIONAL
Work-sharing 25 18 20 20 13 100
Reduced training 0 30 20 60 50 100
Educational leave 25 24 40 0 13 100
FINANCIAL
Unpaid holiday/leave 25 46 70 20 25 0
Forgo bonus pay 0 9 30 20 38 100
Forgo holiday pay 0 6 0 0 13 100
Pay freeze 50 49 70 60 25 100
Pay cut – management 0 30 50 20 38 100
Pay cut – staff 0 21 30 20 50 100
Table 3 – HR Policy Responses (by Region)
25 Ibid.
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Policy Responses
NUMERICAL
Recruitment freeze 24
Voluntary early retirement 14
Voluntary redundancy 0
Compulsory redundancy 0
Voluntary furlough 10
Compulsory furlough 5
Probationary staff not transferred to full time contracts 10
Non-renewal of temporary contracts 24
TEMPORAL
Short-time working 5
Shorter working week 0
Fewer shifts per month 5
Part-time working 10
FUNCTIONAL
Work-sharing 0
Reduced training 38
Educational leave 5
FINANCIAL
Unpaid holiday/leave 19
Forgo bonus pay 19
Forgo holiday pay 5
Pay freeze 29
Pay cut – management 19
Pay cut - staff 14
Table 4 - HR policy Responses to the Crisis at Air Navigation Service Providers
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In order to determine what might be regarded as “socially responsible ways to respond to the crisis”,
trade unions were asked how acceptable a range of different human resource policies would be to their
members. Responses ranged from “Acceptable under normal circumstances”, “Only acceptable as a
short term/crisis measure” and “Unacceptable under any circumstances”. The response of trade unions
representing airline employees is reported in Table 5, while the response of trade unions representing
ATCOs is reported in Table 6. 
The majority of respondents considered voluntary early retirement and educational leave as policies
that might be implemented at any time. The majority of the policies listed, however, were considered
acceptable only as a short term or crisis response. For airline employees, several of these such as re-
cruitment freeze, non-renewal of temporary contracts and pay freeze had been widely implemented. 
A previous study has shown that a significant number of the human resource policies listed, such as
compulsory redundancy and unpaid holiday leave, were deemed unacceptable.26 Despite vehement
opposition in the previous crisis, and in the current crisis these policies have been extensively used by
airline management. 
4. Social dialogue, government intervention
and industry regulation
26 See Turnbull, P., and Harvey, G. (2001) The Impact of 11 September in the Civil Aviation Industry: Social and Labour Effects, Working
Paper No. 182, Geneva: International Labour Office.
N.B. these data reflect the omission of response and so the percentages for the acceptability of the
policies do not sum to 100.
Table 5 – Trade union response to, human resource policies at airlines
Policy Acceptable  Only acceptable Unacceptable  
under normal as a short term/ under any 
circumstances crisis measure circumstances
Recruitment freeze 16 59 8
Voluntary early retirement 36 34 3
Voluntary redundancy 26 41 10
Compulsory redundancy 2 15 54
Voluntary furlough 21 38 10
Compulsory furlough 3 30 38
Unpaid holiday leave 16 28 36
Short-time working 5 59 15
Shorter working week 7 56 10
Fewer shifts per month 7 54 15
Part-time working 23 39 10
Work-sharing 16 38 15
Probationary staff not transferred 
to full time contracts 7 33 33
Non-renewal of temp. contracts 15 48 20
Reduced training 5 28 43
Educational leave 33 18 13
Pay freeze 3 44 33
Forgo holiday pay 3 8 57
Forgo bonus pay 8 23 34
Pay cut (management) - - -
Pay cut (staff) - - -
Pay cut 0 20 61
18
Due to the critical import of training to the safe operation and technological evolution at ANSPs, no
respondent considered the policy of reduced training to be acceptable under normal circumstances,
whereas more than two thirds deemed this policy to be unacceptable under any circumstances.
The human resource policies discussed thus far relate primarily to company-level decisions, although
given that many flag carriers are publicly owned these policies will often involve government input
(e.g. financial support for early retirement programmes and voluntary severance packages or partial
assistance for short-time working). Unions were therefore asked about the policies they believe national
governments should pursue to support the civil aviation industry during the current crisis. A summary
of the results are reported in Table 7.
Mirroring responses to the survey of aviation trade unions after the 2001 industry crisis, there was
strong approval of funding for retraining programmes, whereas financial compensation for loss of busi-
ness/traffic received far less support. A US union official quoted in the previous study explained the
attitude in this way: “The airlines demanded privatization and deregulation in the 1980s. They should
not now be turning to the Government for financial assistance”.27
Once again, the promotion of mergers, acquisitions and consolidation received very little support (al-
though far fewer respondents disagreed with the policy) as these issues are closely associated with
questions of public interest and public services. 
Policy Acceptable  Only acceptable Unacceptable  
under normal as a short term/ under any 
circumstances crisis measure circumstances
Recruitment freeze 5 38 5
Voluntary early retirement 29 14 0
Voluntary redundancy 10 24 5
Compulsory redundancy 0 5 38
Voluntary furlough 19 19 5
Compulsory furlough 0 14 29
Unpaid holiday leave 5 14 24
Short-time working 14 19 10
Shorter working week 14 24 5
Fewer shifts per month 10 24 10
Part-time working 24 14 5
Work-sharing 14 24 5
Probationary staff not transferred 
to full time contracts 5 24 14
Non-renewal of temporary contracts 19 14 10
Reduced training 0 14 29
Educational leave 14 14 5
Pay freeze 0 24 19
Forgo holiday pay 0 5 33
Forgo bonus pay 0 29 14
Pay cut (management) - - -
Pay cut (staff) - - -
Pay cut 0 0 43
Table 6 - Trade union response to, human resource policies at ANSPs
N.B. these data reflect the omission of response and so the percentages for the acceptability of the
policies do not sum to 100.
27 Interview quote from Turnbull, P., and Harvey, G. (2001) The Impact of 11 September in the Civil Aviation Industry: Social and
Labour Effects, Working Paper No. 182, Geneva: International Labour Office.
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The policy that elicited the strongest trade union support was initiatives to promote social dialogue, as
it did in 2001. There is evidence of airlines engaging in extensive and meaningful dialogue with unions
in order to restructure in a socially responsible fashion, and unions evidently regard government initia-
tives in this area as vitally important. Unions clearly see the need for legislative intervention requiring
management to engage labour in restructuring deliberations and policy decisions.
Policy Disagree Neither Agree
agree nor 
disagree
Contribution to pension funds for early retirement 13 16 56
Funding for severance pay 13 26 48
Low cost loans to civil aviation employees 24 22 43
Payments to partially cover short time working 18 23 44
Payments to fully cover short time working 18 24 39
Extending unemployment benefits 13 16 59
Funding for medical/health insurance 11 12 65
Funding for retraining programmes 5 13 72
Financial compensation to airlines for loss of traffic 31 28 27
Financial compensation to airports for loss of business 33 29 23
Financial compensation to other companies (e.g. air traffic 
services, catering, aircraft manufacturers, etc.) 28 28 29
Financial support to airlines/airports for improved security 16 21 52
Relaxation of foreign ownership rules 33 27 22
Protect services to remote communities 6 39 37
Promote mergers/take-overs/consolidation 23 35 28
Initiatives to promote social dialogue 5 10 76
Funding compensation towards maintaining employment 6 10 56
Table 7 – Government policies preferred by unions 
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Once again, the devastating effects of the financial crisis on the industry reiterate the fundamental is-
sues we identified after 9/11: the need for a new approach to labour management and the need for a
more effective regime of industrial regulation.28
There has been little change since the last industry crisis of 2001 in terms of the over reliance on labour
as a ‘variable cost of production’, as the primary adjustment mechanism to be adjusted simply in ac-
cordance with product market demand. It remains of paramount importance that aviation firms recog-
nise and affirm the critical role of the employee in the success of the business and that the firm
demonstrates this commitment by: ensuring adequate staffing levels; investing in its staff to ensure
the appropriate levels of skill and ability; and involving its staff in order to harness the benefits of tacit
knowledge, so very important within civil aviation. At a minimum, this will require a new culture of avi-
ation management built on the principal that employees are a resource to be nurtured and not simply
a cost to be limited.
In the wake of this terrible catastrophe for the industry, pioneers of good practice have adopted a range
of socially responsible initiatives to meet this new challenge. We have noted previously that too much
benchmarking activity has focused on a cost-cutting (negative) approach to human resource manage-
ment – we renew our call for the focus to be shifted to the (positive) productivity-enhancing approach
of employee development and investment in human resources, which provides the basis for long term
success. In particular, legacy airlines cannot hope to compete with low cost carriers simply by cutting
labour costs. If unions are asked to support cost-cutting measures, they need to consider whether this
is simply a short term palliative for an unimaginative management responding to the (short-term) pres-
sures of financial markets, or a genuine attempt to change the cost structure, operating principles and
long-term competitiveness of the airline.
The last ten years has been marked by further deregulation in the industry, with moves towards Open
Skies and a Single European Sky. This has promoted ‘free’, not necessarily ‘fair’ competition. We renew
our call for regulation to enhance ‘fair’ competition, achieved through legitimacy and trust. Legitimacy
can only be achieved through a democratic process – hence the importance of involving all potential
stakeholders. Trust can only be engendered with the development of shared norms, and only made
possible via social dialogue. With a strong institutional base which provides (statutory) rights for con-
sultation, participation and employee representation, aviation firms will be better placed to address
the long term challenges facing the industry, instead of being permitted to respond in a myopic, cost-
focused manner. The civil aviation environment requires a new regulatory regime that must be created
and sustained through social dialogue.
5. Conclusions
28 Harvey, G. And Turnbull, P. (2002) Contesting the Crisis, International Transport Workers Federation, ISBN: 0-901969-83-4
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